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It is now over a year since the Working Time Regulations entered force in Britain on 
1 October 1998, during a period when the government also introduced the minimum 
wage.  But whereas that piece of legislation appears to have faded away into the 
background of British industrial relations, the Working Time Regulations continue to 
remain a central topic, as evidenced by the press coverage given to the recent annual 
conference of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in Brighton.i  Based on a survey of 
British companies and organisations, this article reviews the manner in which the 
legislation was implemented and examines the scope of coverage.ii  It finds that the 
failure of the Labour government to consult the social partners - employer and 
employee representatives – resulted in business being unprepared for the Regulations.  
The article also notes that the manner in which this legislation was introduced has 
meant that many of the employees who were working excessive hours are continuing 
to do so.  
 
Overview 
The implementation of the Working Time Regulations on 1 October 1998 ended 
nearly a decade of British opposition to European Union (EU) attempts to regulate 
working conditions (see appendix 1).  And although the Regulations do not 
implement the whole of the Working Time Directive, Britain has for the first time 
provisions that include a statutory limit on average weekly hours; a statutory 
requirement for breaks throughout the day, at the end of the day and every week or 
fortnight; a general statutory provision for paid annual holidays; controls on the length 
of night shift working; and the provision of protection for young workers (see 
appendix 2).  The effectiveness of these provisions is, however, diluted by the ability 
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for workers to opt-out from the 48-hour maximum working week, which is a singular 
exception among EU states. 
Of other points, the provision for paid holiday entitlement is weakened by the 
ability for public holidays to be counted as part of any holiday right.  These provisions 
were further limited to three weeks until 23 November 1999, at which stage workers 
obtained the four-week entitlement established by the Directive.  And while the 
holiday right has not benefited many trade union members (they tend to have at least 
4-weeks already), it has helped part-time and agency employees who tended to have 
few employment rights.  This has therefore increased the labour costs incurred by 
employers which has, for example, taken away the benefit of employing staff on zero 
hour contracts.iii  (This was something that the government did not want to tackle 
through legislation.) 
A resistance by Britain to implement the Directive had been influenced by the 
then Conservative government regarding working hours (and other social policy 
matters) as a domestic matter for negotiation between employers, trade unions and 
employees.  Such a stance was influenced by the desire to retain a competitive 
advantage within the EU through the absence of regulated labour costs.  Conservative 
Ministers consequently challenged the introduction of the EU Working Time 
Directive in the European Court of Justice in 1996.  This course of action proved to be 
unsuccessful, with the resulting effect that Britain had to prepare for the 
implementation of the Directive, for which Ministers did so with no sign of impetus 
or speed.  The end product of this state of affairs was that the Labour government that 
entered office in May 1997 inherited a rather mixed bag of policy developments, 
including the agreement obtained by the Conservative government that permitted 
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employees to choose to work more than 48-hours per week.  (Labour was not bound 
by these decisions.) 
 
A lack of negotiation 
Upon election to office, Labour inherited a policy of implementation that had 
commenced with the Court of Justice’s decision.  While this need to implement was 
not a problem for Labour - they had accepted this policy in opposition - the question 
of how to implement the Directive did pose a problem.  (The Directive provides the 
ability for different national interpretation.)  This was the product of New Labour 
having to balance the interests of its old trade union comrades and its new business 
friends who wanted to retain an economically competitive labour force. 
A perceived need to reflect these differing pressures did not result in the 
government embarking in a formal negotiating process involving the social partners.  
Instead, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) sought to obtain business and 
trade union views by means of a scheduled consultation period from April to July 
1998 (when the finalised regulations were placed before Parliament).  An absence of 
round table bargaining that involved all parties mirrored the stance adopted by the 
previous Conservative administration, and consequently resulted in bilateral rather 
than multilateral discussions.  The end product of this was an absence of hard 
bargaining between all parties as to what was and was not attainable, and the resulting 
absence of any real recommendations.iv  A lack of social partner dialogue was a 
strategic objective by the government to ensure that its viewpoints were not 
compromised through a formal consultation procedure. 
This contrasted with the experience of the minimum wage, where the evidence 
collection exercise meant that trade unions, employer representatives and employers 
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knew that their views were being taken seriously, and they could moreover see that 
the government wanted to proceed on the basis of consensus.  That is not to say that 
the discussions were easy, because they were often difficult.  They did, however, 
produce a unanimous report by the Low Pay Commission.  And while it was 
subsequently dealt a blow by the government not fully accepting it, this was more the 
product of tension between the Treasury (Gordon Brown) and the DTI (Margaret 
Beckett), than about the reality of the policy.  In this context, the fundamental point to 
remember is that whereas employers had argued in late 1997 that anything above £3 
would result in economic chaos, the social partner process resulted in a mutual 
agreement of £3.60.  Moreover, although there was some initial hesitation concerning 
the implementation of the minimum wage from 1 April 1999, there has subsequently 
been very little discussion about this matter.   
The Working Time Regulations were, by contrast, devoid of this type of social 
partner process.  Three main factors determined this decision.  In the first instance, the 
Labour government did not intend to make the issue of Working Time a showpiece 
for its term of governmentv; it inherited a rather messy policy from the previous 
Conservative administration and did not set out to dramatically change this situation, 
despite having the ability to do so.  The minimum wage was clearly different, being a 
policy shaped by Labour and one that they could use as a litmus test of their style of 
government.  Secondly, the government was concerned that any social partner 
discussion could have resulted in a firmer set of policy guidelines, thereby 
contradicting the desire to have a flexible interpretation of the Directive.  Finally, in 
the early years of its administration, Labour wanted to present itself as a safe and 
conservative government, evidenced by budget prudence.  An unadventurous 
interpretation of the Working Time Directive was therefore part of this objective.  
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Nevertheless, the reality of the matter is that the Labour government would 
undoubtedly have achieved a far more agreeable set of guidelines on Working Time if 
it had entered into some form of social dialogue.vi  This discussion would have 
produced two principal benefits.  The government would have obtained important 
negotiating experience from the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and TUC 
who had participated in social partner dialogue at the EU level, while the social 
partners could have provided their members with a clearer set of guidelines. 
 
A lack of details 
The problems that surrounded the negotiating process on Working Time (or lack of it) 
had a direct impact on the manner in which the Regulations were implemented.  There 
were two particular issues associated with this.  The first concerned the instructions 
that the government provided to employers.  In this context, it was evident that the 
lack of a social partner consultation process produced a lower standard of guidelines 
than could have otherwise been achieved.  This point was noted by all correspondents 
for this research, and was further illustrated by the differing levels of advice offered, 
as highlighted in tables 1 and 2. 
Table 1: Advising on Working Time 












EEF No Yes Yes Yes Yes 130 
MSF Yes No Yes No Yes 79 
TUC No No Yes No Yes 55 
DTI No No Yes No Yes 74 
T&G No No Yes No No 31 
AEEU No No Yes No No 30 
USDAW No No Yes No No 24 
UNISON Yes No Yes No No 40 
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An examination of these documents shows that the official DTI guideline was not 
the most comprehensive survey, a point emphasised by the Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry, Stephen Byers, ordering a rewrite of the DTI’s guide to the 
working time regulations in March 1999.vii  This was in response to complaints from 
business about mistakes, omissions and misleading entries.viii  By that stage, the initial 
version had already been changed, with the second version being identified by the 
appearance of the word ‘workright’ on its cover.  Among the inaccuracies it corrected, 
were the wrong formula for calculating average hours of night work, two different 
formulae for working out compliance with the 48-hour week and an arithmetic error 
in an example of night work calculation. 
Other disparities between the advice offered by the DTI and professional 
organisations included definitions regarding on-call workers that had to sleep on site, 
the question of unmeasured working time and the issue of travelling time (see table 
2).  In these three areas the DTI guidance was unclear and left a great deal of scope 
for interpretation, resulting in some employers going against government advice.  
This included the National Health Service Executive, which stressed that ‘those 
workers who are required by their employer to be at their place of work and sleeping-
in, will be considered to be working as they are at their employer’s disposal and 
carrying out their duties’ (NHS, 1998, p.2, emphasis added).  This clearly went 
against the DTI position that ‘if a worker is required to be at the place of work ‘on 
call’, but was sleeping though available to work if necessary, a worker would not be 
working and so the time spent asleep would not count as working time’ (DTI, 1998, 
p.16, emphasis added).   
Of other points, the DTI position on travelling time was equally blurred as it 
provided no guidelines on whether time spent sleeping on a plane was working time 
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or not, which resulted in many major companies concluding that travelling time was 
working time.ix  This was based on the assumption that although employees may not 
have been working while they were travelling, they were nevertheless in the course of 
their employment and that if they did not classify this as working time then they 
would be exposing themselves from the point of view of personal injury law.x  In both 
these cases the DTI had therefore favoured a minimalist position that did not set 
concrete objectives.  In this context, the degree of implementation would be 
established at company level, with the intention of making the impact on industry as 
minimal as possible.  This strategy did, of course, contradict the objective of the 
Directive to establish a uniform standard. 
Table 2: Classifications of Working Time 
 
Advice On Call and sleeping 




EEF No clear advice.  
Suggested workers 
who are on call and on 
site could be classified 
as working time. 
Only those managing 
executives whose 
work is not measured 
or predetermined are 
excluded. 
Travelling to work is not 
working time, but time 
spent travelling to visit a 
client is working time, 
as is travelling abroad. 
MSF Should be considered 
as working time. 
Stresses that it would 
be unusual for more 
than 1 or 2 people in 
a business that had 
autonomous decision-
making powers. 
Working time is when a 
worker is expected to 
engage in activity on 
behalf of the employer, 
such as travel to a 
distant workplace. 
TUC Should be established 
by collective or 
relevant agreements. 
Most managers are 
outwith this category, 
having a degree of 
measured time. 
Should be established by 
collective or relevant 
agreements. 
DTI If a worker is on call, 
but was sleeping 
though available to 
work, then this should 
not be counted as 
working time. 
Vague description 
that includes workers 
with managerial 
responsibility, 
suggesting that they 
are excluded. 
Travel to and from work 
not counted as working 
time, though working 
abroad does count. No 
advice on other travel, 
such as from workplace 
to workplace. 
T&G Little advice. States 
that negotiators should 
obtain a definition that 
suits their own needs. 
Unclear advice.  
States that managers 
are covered, but no 
concrete information. 
Little advice.  States that 
negotiators should 
obtain a definition that 
suits their own needs. 
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AEEU No advice. No advice, but 
suggested that this 
only apply to 
managing executives. 
No advice. 
USDAW No advice. Senior executives. No advice. 
UNISON No advice. Most managers do 
not have control over 
working hours. 
Should be covered by 
Regulations.  No 
examples provided. 
 
The second problem concerned the dearth of information that was available to 
business and trade union representatives, who spent much of July and August 1998 
speculating as to what the specific detail of the Regulations would be.  This was 
because they had not been privy to the same level of information as would have been 
the case had there been a social partner process.  The resulting effect of this was to 
leave many organisations unprepared for the implementation of the Regulations, a 
difficulty that was further accentuated because they were only provided with the 
government’s guidelines in September, just weeks before the Regulations took 
effect.xi  This situation obviously impacted on the quality of advice that was provided, 
as well as its very timing.  As a TUC official commented, ‘it would have been much 
easier to manage implementation if the Regulations had been part of a negotiated 
process, which would then have reduced the number of complaints from 
employers’.xii  This was a view equally held by the CBI.xiii 
This state of affairs prompted many employers to make individual decisions 
regarding who was or was not covered by the Regulations.  For most, the crucial issue 
was to establish who would not be covered.  In the case of the 48-hour limit, some 
companies took the unilateral decision to exempt whole tiers of upper management 
from this provision as well as insisting that new graduate recruits sign opt-outs.  And 
although this clearly flouts the spirit of the Regulations, which provides the example 
of senior executives, many businesses considered it to be an acceptable practice.  
(Many of these employees are, of course, not union members.). 
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Scope and coverage 
So what has been the effect of the Regulations on British employment practices?  First 
of all, the 48-hour week provision has not had a significant impact in changing 
working practices.  All of the companies that were contacted for this research had 
contracted weekly hours of 40-hours or less, while they also noted a movement away 
from the use of overtime.  And when employees did work in excess of 48-hours, they 
did so for only a short period of time, such as the Christmas sales.  At the other end of 
the spectrum, the 48-hour week has had little impact in curtailing the number of hours 
worked by managers.  The simple reason for this is that many white-collar 
management employees have chosen to opt-out of the 48-hour limit, or do not bother 
with the Regulations. 
This problem is likely to be exacerbated by the recent amendments to the 
Regulations that were tabled by the government on 27th July 1999, including an 
extension to the definition of unmeasured working time.xiv  The intention here is to 
allow those workers who have an element of their working time that is predetermined, 
such as by means of contract, to work longer hours if they choose to do so.xv  The 
significance of these developments is that they show little evidence of any move 
towards a negotiated reduction in working hours.  This therefore leaves open the issue 
of how government, employers and trade unions will respond when the European 
Commission likely puts a stop to this procedure when it is reviewed in 2003.  Some 
unions also appear to be reluctant to tackle this issue because it would lead to 




The above information demonstrates that the Working Time Regulations have had a 
mixed impact in Britain, while they have not curbed the major problem of managerial 
employees working excessive hours.  Britain is, of course, not alone in having this 
problem, with weekly hours being longer in America (ILO, 1999), though Britain has 
a long-hour culture in EU terms.xvii  There is moreover no evidence to suggest that 
any effort is being made to develop a negotiated reduction in working hours. 
The reality of this situation can be traced back to the manner in which the 
Regulations were implemented, with their being no social partner involvement.  This 
could have been different, as the government had plenty of time to think about 
involving the unions and employers.  We have to remind ourselves that the process of 
consultation did not commence until April 1998, one month short of a year after 
Labour took office.  The second point to bear in mind is that a negotiated reduction in 
hours, rather than creating a blanket provision, would have avoided some of the 
bureaucracy that companies have had to face in recording hours of work, as it would 
initially have permitted a higher number of weekly hours.  The third point is that the 
government was aware that Ireland adopted a negotiated reduction in working hours 
and such a path was therefore not a new one (Ireland, 1997).xviii  Such changes may 
have resulted in a different outcome, with the likelihood of reducing the continued 
effort spent by Ministers and officials on this subject. 
That is not to say that the Regulations are not important.  They are.  For the first 
time in recent history a British government has provided workers with important 
employment rights, many of whom had no or only few existing entitlements.  It is 
unlikely that these new benefits will, however, benefit all, as many workers continue 
to be employed in sweatshops on the fringes of the economy, while the government 
has only provided few resources to enforce the Regulations.  There are, in fact, fewer 
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than 10 Health and Safety Executive enforcing officers.  But, the point to remember is 
that although the government might not be able to examine the working practices of 
all the sweatshop operators, it is able to tackle the conditions of work faced by those 
in the mainstream of economy.   
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Appendix 1: 
Working Time Chronology 
Dec.1989: Social Charter signed by EC Member States (except UK) at Strasbourg 
European Council. 
Sept. 1990: Commission submitted its proposal for a Draft Directive concerning 
certain aspects of the Organisation of Working Time. 
June 1992: UK obtained concessions at a meeting of the Social Affairs Council on 24 
June, including the ability to work for more than 48-hours per week. 
June 1993: Council reached agreement on a common position on the draft Working 
Time Directive on 1 June. UK announced its intention to challenge the 
Directive’s legal base at the meeting. 
Nov.1993: Commission resubmitted its proposal to the Council on 23 November, 
where it was adopted by means of QMV (UK abstained).  
March 1994: UK made its application to the European Court of Justice for the 
annulment of the Directive. 
March 1996: Advocate General of the European Court of Justice gave his opinion on 
12 March, which went against the UK. 
Nov. 1996: European Court of Justice confirmed its opinion on 12 November 1996. 
Nov. 1996: UK accepted that the Working Time Directive would have to be 
implemented within Britain. 
Dec. 1996: UK government issued a consultative document on 6 December for the 
implementation of the Working Time Directive.  
June 1997: UK Labour government accepted the Social Chapter at Amsterdam 
European Council. 
April 1998: Labour government issued draft implementing Regulations for 
consultation on the Working Time Directive. 
July 1998: Working Time Regulations were laid before the UK Parliament. 
Oct. 1998: Working Time Regulations entered force in the UK. 
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Appendix 2: 
Key provisions of Working Time Regulations  
1. Maximum weekly working time of 48 hours (including overtime) averaged over a 
17-week reference period [Regulation 4].  The reference period can be varied by 
collective agreement to a duration not exceeding 52 weeks.  Individuals can opt-
out of the 48-hour limit [Regulation 5]. 
2. A minimum of two uninterrupted rest periods of 24 hours in every 14 days, or one 
uninterrupted 48-hour rest period in every 14 days.  In addition, every worker 
must have a daily rest period of 11 hours.  The weekly rest period for young 
workers must be 48 hours (rather than 24 for an adult). [Regulation 11]. 
3. A rest break for 20 minutes for workers whose working day is longer than 6 hours.  
An uninterrupted daily rest period of 11 hours, and a weekly rest period of at least 
24 hours in seven days. 
4. A minimum period of leave of 3 weeks per year (after 13 weeks’ service), rising 
to 4 weeks by 23 November 1999.  Part-time workers have to receive pro-rata 
entitlements. 
5. Night workers cannot be required to work more than 8 hours per night (on 
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